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NOTES

RIGHTS OF THE ORIGINAL APPROPRIATOR TO RECAPTURE
WATER USED IN IRRIGATION
In the arid and semi-arid regions of the West, water is precious. Here
the law contemplates the conservation of water so that it may be subjected
to the greatest practical use. Actually, only a small amount of the water
diverted from streams to be used in irrigation is beneficially consumed in
plant growth. After application to the soil, the water may collect in lower
levels on the lands of the appropriator forming swamps; or it may percolate or drain naturally, thereby escaping from his lands. The irrigation
water may also escape from the appropriator's reservoirs or canals before
the water can be beneficially used in irrigation. This article is concerned
with the right of the original appropriator to recapture these waters which
escape from his lands or structures.'
In general, the original appropriator may recapture water before it
leaves his land or prevent its escape. He is under no obligation to continue
wasting the waters. The rights of an appropriator are not affected by the
fact that the waters have once been used. Most courts require that the
recapture be for a beneficial purpose, and some require the element of
good faith.
This right to recapture by the original appropriator on his own land is
well settled as against a claim by a lower landowner who has intercepted
and benefically used the escaping water before it reaches a stream.2 A
number of states including Colorado, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and
Nebraska permit appropriation of waste waters abandoned by the original
appropriator, but such appropriations are subject to the right of the
original appropriator to cease wasting the water. Neither can this right
to recapture be lost by abandonment, for it is only the specific particles of
water allowed to escape from the premises and run to waste that is abandoned, not the incoming waters or particles of water to be acquired in
the future.3 In other words, while there can be abandonment of water
which has left the appropriator's lands, the right to cease the waste is never
lost, no matter how long the waste has continued.
In some states, notably Colorado and Utah, appropriators of a stream
acquire a right to have the waste water continue to the stream, if the water
was originally diverted therefrom. 4 This right, however, does not take
1. The article does not cover that field of law concerning return flow originally

diverted from a stream system or watershed foreign to the stream system to which
it would return. Reference, however, has been made to cases involving such waters.
2. Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867, 872, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1159 (1912).
Here, the court stated that the law is well settled, in fact the authorities all agree,
that one landowner receiving waste water which flows, seeps, or percolates from
the land of another cannot acquire a prescriptive right to such water nor any right
(except by grant) to have the owner of the land from which he obtains the water
continue the flow. See also, Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 Pac. 98 (1906).
3. Wiel, S.C. Water Rights in Western States (3rd ed. 1911), 'p. 51.
4. Comstock v. Ramsey, 55 Colo. 244, 133 Pac. 1107 (1913). Rasmussen v. Moroni,
56 Utah 140, 189 Pac. 572 (1920).
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effect until after the original appropriator allows the irrigation water to
waste from his lands or structures. But once the water is released it must
be allowed to return to the stream.
A different problem is presented when a natural stream flows through
the lands of the appropriator. If he allows drainage or seepage to waste
into the stream, it becomes subject to prior appropriations along the stream.
Upon entering the stream, the drainage water becomes public water of the
state and is no longer waste or seepage, though it may have been such
previously. 5 In Ramshorn Ditch Company v. United States,6 involving
the North Platte Reclamation Project which encompasses lands on both
sides of the North Platte River, the Federal Court recognized that the
return flow, allowed to reach the river and commingle with its water is
considered a part of the river inuring to the benefit of prior appropriators
thereof. It was so held in a recent Utah case, Lasson v. Seely.7 Here, the"
waters drained and seeped naturally into a slough, which was a watercourse, flowing from the appropriators' lands to the lands of a lower owner
who had an appropriation for the use of the slough waters. The landowner built a dam across the slough to recover the drainage and seepage.
The court held that the water which had entered the stream was then out
of the landowner's control and could not be recaptured from the stream
without reappropriation. Thus, the original appropriator cannot build
a dam upon the stream flowing within his lands' to reclaim waters lost
to the stream by natural drainage or seepage.
However, if the appropriator continues in possession and control of
the waste water, as by collecting it in a drain, and deposits it into the
stream with the intention of using the stream -as a conduit, such water is
still private, belonging to the appropriator and not the public. The water
may be commingled with the waters of a stream, but it must be accurately
measured when entering the stream and the loss due to evaporation and
other causes while flowing in the stream must be accounted for, so as not
to injure downstream appropriators. Where the seepage arises in the
stream, it is lost to the appropriator, for it is difficult, if not impossible,
to identify the amount commingled with the waters of the stream. An
interesting view was taken by the Supreme Court of Montana in the case
of Rock Creek Ditch and Flume Company v. Miller,8 regarding seepage
water arising in a stream. The court stated that water used in irrigation,
except that which escapes control and runs away upon the surface, sinks
in the ground; and, less that part which is consumed by plant life, mingles
with the soil and remains suspended therein, or by percolation reaches
bedrock, which frequently is the bed of a stream. Becoming a part of the
stream, it is available for further use, and subject to appropriation. The
5.
6.
7.
8.

Binning ii. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54 (1940).
269 Fed. 80 (8th Cir. 1920). District court decision in 254 Fed. 842 (D. Nebr.,
1918).
120 Utah 671, 238 P.2d 418 (1951).
93 Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074, 89 A.L.R. 200 (1921).
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court said that seepage waters in this instance loose their identity, and
ownership over them is lost. This is to be contrasted with often quoted
words from the opinion of District Judge Dietrich in United States v.
Haga.9 In the absence of abandonment,
"... one who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts
appropriable water from a stream, and thus makes it available for
fruitful purpose, is entitled to its exclusive control so long as he
is able and willing to apply it to a beneficial use, and such right
extends to what is commonly known as wastage from surface
run-off and deep percolation. . . Nor is it essential to his control
that the appropriator maintain continuous actual possession of
such water."
Of course, even under this opinion there is still the difficult problem of
identification of the seepage, a necessary prerequisite to the right of recapture.
Although the appropriator may lose his right to the waste water,
which he allows to waste into a stream on his own lands, he may recapture
the waste before it enters the stream. In the Utah case, previously discussed,
Lasson v. Seely,o the court recognized the right of the original appropriator
to recapture drainage on his own land before it entered the stream.
But, when seepage is returning to the stream from which it was originally
diverted, courts have encountered some difficulty in sustaining the right
to recapture before the seepage enters the stream. The problem was
recently before the Supreme Court of Montana in two separate cases involving the same parties and over the same dispute. The dispute first
reached the court in the case of Woodward v. Perkins," followed four years
later by Perkins v. Kramer.'2 The appropriator attempted to divert water
into "pot holes" for storage. The precise scheme failed and the waters
seeped back toward the stream due to the porosity of the soil. The stream
flowed through the lands of the appropriator, and by means of ditches
next to the stream, he intercepted the seepage just before it entered the
stream. Lower appropriators of the stream objected to his interference.
In the first case the appropriator was denied the right to recapture. A
majority of the court held that water seeping through the soil loses
identity; and the seepage arising along the bed of a stream, as a part of its
supply and source, is a part of the stream. The dissent set forth the issue
as being one of identification of the seepage only, and held that the trial
courts finding on this issue should be conclusive. Also, the dissent iterated
the general rule that an appropriator may recapture waters before they
13
Following
escape from his land, and cited Montana cases in support.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

276 Fed. 41 (D. Idaho, 1921).
Note 7 supra.
116 Mont. 46, 147 P.2d 1016 (1944).
Defendant, Kramer, was a plaintiff in the
121 Mont. 595, 198 P.2d 475 (1948).
previous case of Woodward v. Perkins, note 11 supra.
One of the cases cited is Rock Creek Ditch and Flume Co. v. Miller, note 8 supra,
in which the general rule was stated to be, that an owner of the right to use the
waste on his own private property, while in his possession, may collect it, recapture
it, before it leaves his possession, but after it gets beyond his control, it thus becomes
waste and is subject to appropriation by another.
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this decision, the appropriator ceased diverting the water into the "pot
holes" and the seepage arising in the drains disappeared. He again brought
his cause before the court, the second case cited above, with demonstrative
proof that the seepage collected in his drains was the same he had attempted
to store. This time the court recognized his right to recapture the escaping
waters and a commission of a manifest error in the former decision. A
vigorous dissenting opjnion accompanied this second case.
Often the seepage and drainage will collect in a natural depression on
the land of the original appropriator, flowing naturally therefrom. The
artificial flow may soon take on the characteristics of a natural watercourse
and become subject to appropriation even in states not having statutes
permitting appropriation of seepage and drainage waters. 14 But even
these appropriations remain subject to the right of the original appropriator
to recapture from the artificially created stream before the water leaves his
premises. 15
The appropriator may allow the waste waters to flow naturally from
his premises; or, if necessary, he may construct a drainage system to take
the waste from his land. The courts have applied two similar tests to
determine whether the original appropriator may claim the right to these
waters off his premises. The primary test is "abandonment". If the
appropriator allows the water to escape from his premises with no intent to
recapture, he has abandoned the right to reclaim. 16 Another test is
whether the appropriator controls the waste leaving his land, thereby retaining possession. 17 Actually, the two tests have the same effect as to
surface drainage, but when the water escapes by seeping underground and
reappears on the lands of others a different result is reached with each
test. If the original appropriator intended to recapture the escaping
seepage, under the first test he has not abandoned the seepage and could
reclaim it. By applying the control test he would no longer have any right
to the seepage.
While the return flow from a single appropriator is usually insignificant, the amount of return flow from an irrigation district or federal project is very great in many instances, and the right of the project to recapture becomes a more serious problem.' 8 The large amount of return
flow created within the boundaries of a project, due to waste from irrigation
or seepage from structures, either seeks existing streams or forms a stream
of itself, constituting a watercourse. The right of recapture from these
streams is dependent upon whether the project has abandoned its right to
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Binning v. Miller, note 5 supra.
Binning v. Miller, note 4 supra.
Schulz v. Sweeney, 19 Nev. 359, 11 Pac. 253 (1886). Milner Low Lift Irr. Dist.
v. Eagen, 49 Idaho 184, 276 Pac. 608 (1930).
Hagerman Irr. Co. v. East Grand Plans Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649, 187 Pac. 555
(1920). See also, Rock Creek Ditch and Flume Co. v. Miller, note 8 supra.
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 596, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 1341, 89 L.Ed. 1815, the
SFecial Master's Report showed the amount of return flow from the North Platte
Project to be 700,000 acre feet in 1927.
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reclaim such waters. 19 The intention to abandon is essential and must be
determined as a question of fact. The intention to recapture must exist
at the time the seepage and drainage waters are allowed to escape from
the control of the project. 20
Intention alone is insufficient. Within a
reasonable time the project must pursue by some overt act to recapture the
escaping water. 2 1 Of course, if the appropriator does abandon, he may
recapture if no new rights to the water have been a~quired.
The right of a project to recapture in the absence of abandonment is
the prevailing rule, but in Colorado the rule is different where the water
escapes from a project's reservoir or canal. In Colorado, once the water
seeps from the reservoir or canal, and would return to the stream, it cannot
be recaptured or intercepted but must be allowed to return to the stream. 22
Under this rule intention to recapture and diligence in attempting to recapture are immaterial. 23 But the Colorado rule applies only to seepage
which merges or mingles with the underground water. In McKelvey v.
North Sterling IrrigationDistrict,24 the waters from a ditch crossing a draw
seeped through the bank of the ditch into the draw. The court, in upholding the right to recapture, stated that the water once lawfully in
possession of the appropriator may, in the absence of an intent to abandon,
be prevented from escaping, or may be recaptured while escaping. This
case is distinguished from those cases involving seepage which commingles
with underground waters in Ft. Morgan Reservoir and Irrigation Company
v. McCune.25 In United States v. Tilley,2 6 the federal court held the
Colorado view to be contra to the view taken by a majority of courts today.
The law regarding the appropriator's right to recapture escaping
irrigation water is still in a formative stage. The problem will continue to
present itself for a certain amount of waste from irrigated lands and
irrigation structures is inevitable. As new appropriations continue to drain
the available water resources of existing streams in the West, flows from
irrigation projects and lands become more important; and much litigation
can be expected over such waters in the future.
DON E. JONES
19.

20.

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

United States v. Ide, 263 U.S. 497, 44 S.Ct. 182, 68 L.Ed. 407 (1924), involved
recapture by the United States of seepage waters within its project which were flowing in what had been a dry gulch. The court stated that the law was clear, that
the United States had a right to save and continue to use drainage, seepage, and
waste waters of its project as long as such waters could be identified and had not
been abandoned.
Intent to recapture must exist when the return flow becomes an artificial increment
to the stream or is discharged into the stream: Jones v. Warmsprings Irr. Dist.,
162 Ore. 186, 91 P.2d 542 (1939). See also, Ramshore Ditch Co. v. United States,
note 9 supra.
See cases cited in note 20 supra and also United States v. Haga, note 9 supra.
For the development of the doctrine in Colorado, see: Comstock v. Ramsay, 55
Colo. 244, 133 Pac. 1107 (1913); Durkee Ditch Co. v. Means, 63 Colo. 6, 164 Pac.
503 (1917); Trowel Land & Irr. Co. v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 176 Pac. 292
(1918); McKelvey v. North Sterling Irr. Dist., 66 Colo. 11, 179 Pac. 872 (1919);
Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 66 Colo.
202, 191 Pac. 129 (1920); and Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo.
256, 206 Pac. 393 (1922).
Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 206 Pac. 293 (1922).
66 Colo. 11, 179 Pac. 872 (1919).
Note 23 supra.
124 F.2d 850, 858 (1941), certiorari denied, 316 U.S. 691 (1942).

